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GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, DEBT 
AND FISCAL ADJUSTMENT 
IN SMALL STATES 
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Abstract. Using a new fiscal dataset for small states, this paper 
analyses the link between country size, government size, debt, 
and economic performance. It finds that on average small states 
have larger governments and higher public debt. Although there 
are intrinsic factors that explain why governments are bigger in 
small states, those with smaller governments and lower public 
debt tend to grow faster and are less vulnerable and more 
economically resilient to external shocks. Large fiscal adjustments, 
primarily through expenditure restraint, can underpin growth, 
especially when embedded in an economic reform programme. 
Since better governance is associated with lower debt, fiscal 
adjustment should be supported by governance improvements. 
1. Introduction 
Certain fiscal characteristics of small states can affect the implementation 
of sound policies. In providing public services, small states tend to face 
higher per capita costs because of their limited ability to reap the benefits 
of economies of scale, which leads to an inverse relationship between 
country size and the size of government (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998; 
Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). Small states are more open and more 
exposed to external shocks, and may therefore require a bigger 
government to provide an insulating role (Rodrik, 1996). Customs 
revenues tend to be a larger share of total revenues and income taxes a 
lower share because it costs less in overheads to collect customs tax 
than income tax (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Borg, 2006). 
Since the early 1990s, in many small states a growing public debt problem 
has been worsened by a slowdown in growth rates, partly due to the 
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erosion of trade preferences and to shocks (Dodhia, 2005; Briguglio, 
Persaud and Stern, 2006). During this period, for instance, sluggish 
growth and fiscal pressures have emerged in some Pacific islands 
(Browne, 2006), and rising debt has been especially pronounced in the 
Caribbean countries (Sahay et al., 2006). Large fiscal deficits in small 
states can undermine their economic resilience to recover from adverse 
shocks (Briguglio et al., 2006). 
This study has two main objectives. The first is to extend previous studies 
of the size of government in small states to a close analysis of public debt 
levels. The second is to draw policy recommendations for fiscal tightening 
from the experience of small states so they can withstand their economic 
vulnerability stemming from high economic volatility, and strengthen their 
economic resilience through the reduction of high public debt. 
Although there are structural factors related to higher government 
spending in small states, many of them can use fiscal tightening to boost 
their flexibility in response to external shocks and so underpin their 
resilience. 
The study also presents evidence that drastic fiscal adjustment can 
support growth in small states, particularly when supported by an 
economic reform plan. Similarly, improving governance and 
transparency can help lower public and external debt. 
Using a new fiscal dataset for 42 small states, the results presented in 
this study confirm that there is a significant negative correlation 
between country size and size of government. Small states tend to have 
higher government spending on goods and services, wages and 
salaries, and capital investment. They also provide some new evidence 
of an inverse relationship between country size and the amount of 
public debt and external public debt in small states. Furthermore, the 
study unveils fresh evidence that in small states weak governance (or 
low government effectiveness) is associated with higher total public 
and external debt. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 defines 
small states and presents some stylised facts about these states. Section 
3 discusses a number of fiscal indicators with special reference to small 
states. Section 4 presents empirical analysis relating to the link between 
country size and government expenditure and its components. A similar 
exercise is carried out with regard to debt. Section 5 expounds policy 
considerations and measures relating to fiscal adjustment and resilience 
building in small states. Finally, section 6 puts forward some relevant 
recommendations and concludes the study. 
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2. Small States: Stylised Facts 
Definition of Small and Large States 
Small states in this chapter are defined as developing and emerging-
market countries that have a population of about two million or less.1 
We add Jamaica and Papua New Guinea, because, although having 
higher populations, these states have many of the economic and physical 
characteristics of small states. This definition is somewhat broader than 
the one used by the World Bank and the Commonwealth Secretariat, 
which sets a population ceiling of 1.5 million but they also add Jamaica, 
Lesotho, Namibia, and Papua New Guinea, resulting in a similar list of 
countries. (Other measures of economic size, such as total GNP or GDP, 
territory size, and total arable land, have been used to rank countries 
according to size, but population data is more readily available, and 
may be more directly related to economic realities.)2 This study uses a 
sample of 42 small states from all regions of the world -14 from Africa, 
9 from Asia Pacific, 4 from Europe, 2 from the Middle East, and 13 
from the Western Hemisphere. 3 Of these, 26 are islands and 4 are 
landlocked. 
It follows from the above definition of small states, that a large country 
is defined as a country with a population of over two million. The large 
country sample consists of 25 developing and emerging-market countries 
from different regions, with the majority being mainland countries. This 
comparator group of large countries was chosen because fiscal data on 
these countries, particularly on public debt and the composition of 
expenditures, which is usually difficult to obtain, was readily available 
from the Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF. 
Remoteness and Limited Economies of Scale 
Remoteness and limited ability to reap the benefits of economies of scale 
in small states are two reasons explaining their higher cost structure, 
which tends to raise government expenditures and can impact public 
debt. Many small states, particularly in Africa and the Pacific, are located 
1 The classification of a country as a developing and emerging-market one was largely 
based on the IMF World Economic Outlook classification from 2006, the time when this 
study was initiated. 
7 There i• nu ,ingl"' dO'finilion of ~ mv1ll 11·.itr. with mo8t rldinition8 hrini; hn8rrl on 
population size. Some definitions are based on economic or geographic size. In reality, 
there is a continuous range of country sizes, with countries larger than the chosen threshold 
sharing some characteristics of small states. 
3 See Appendix, Tables Al and A2, for a detailed overview of small states and large 
countries. 
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physically far from major markets or trading partners. These are often 
islands, although there are also a few landlocked countries. Remoteness 
tends to raise transport costs. 
Expenditure indivisibilities in the government's provision of goods and 
services also lead to larger governments (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998). 
There are fixed costs in creating public institutions and providing public 
services like policing, education, justice, social services, and foreign 
affairs. Because these public services must be provided independent of 
population size, in small states the cost is higher per person (or taxpayer).4 
Table 1 shows the significant cost disadvantages associated with small 
size in such areas as transportation, travel, fuel, and some utilities 
(Winters and Martins, 2004). Higher costs result from high costs of 
imported inputs as well as remoteness. 
Table 1 
Cost Disadvantages of Very Small and Small States 
(Percentage Deviation from those in the Median Economy) 
Area of Cost Micro 
Unskilled wages average 
Airfreight average 
Seafreight average 
Telephone average (marginal costs) 
Electricity (marginal costs) 
Water (marginal costs) 
Fuel average 
Personal air travel average 
Land rent average 
60.1 
31.8 
219.6 
98.5 
93.1 
0.0 
53.8 
115.7 
-3.5 
Very Small* Small* 
31.6 6.6 
4.1 -1.7 
70.5 9.1 
47.2 9.0 
47.0 9.4 
0.0 0.0 
28.3 5.9 
56.8 11.0 
-17.2 -8.9 
Source: Winters and Martins (2004) 
*A very small state is one with a population of 200,000 or less, and a small state is one with 
a population of no more than 4 million population. The median for population is 10 million. 
Lack of Economic and Export Diversification 
Many small states depend heavily on a narrow range of exports, 
including primary commodities. This can raise the size of government 
expenditure because small states are particularly vulnerable to 
4 Population density can impact the size of government as after a certain point, higher 
congestion may raise the cost of some public goods and services. However, others may 
argue that a more geographically disperse population may raise the cost of delivery of 
some government services. We control for population density in the empirical analysis. 
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commodity or weather-related shocks. UNCT AD publishes a 
concentration index for exports by country with values ranking from 0 
to 1, the latter indicating maximum concentration. For small states in 
2003, the merchandise export concentration index was 0.41, compared 
to 0.24 for all developing countries.5 Similar results were reported by 
Briguglio and Galea (2003), who factored in services in the concentration 
index of countries (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 
Export Concentration Index 
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Source: Briguglio and Galea (2003) 
In many small states, one to three sectors typically dominate exports -
for example, tourism and canned tuna in Seychelles, tourism in Samoa, 
timber and fish in the Solomon Islands, and tourism and bananas in St 
Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines. In fact, tourism is a major and 
growing export for many small states, especially in the Caribbean, Indian 
Ocean (Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles), and to a lesser degree in 
the Pacific islands. These last tend to rely on primary commodities, with 
little diversification into manufacturing (Browne, 2006). Several African 
small states, such as Botswana, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, and Namibia, 
also rely on primary commodities. The European states of Cyprus and 
Malta have more diversified economies. 
High Degree of Openness 
Small states tend to be far more open, as reflected in a high ratio of 
external trade to GDP (Figure 2) and in their reliance on foreign capital 
and investment. Openness results from the fact that the domestic market 
5 Seehttp://stats.unctad.org/handbook/. 
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of small states is very small, they depend heavily on imported industrial 
supplies and, as a result, they require substantial foreign exchange 
inflows to meet their high import bill. While openness to trade and 
foreign investment helps small states overcome their inherent scale and 
resource constraints, it also makes them vulnerable to external economic 
shocks. 
Figure 2 
Trade Openness* (2000-04) 
1.2 -.-----------------------. 
1.0 
0.8 
0.6 . 
0.4 
0.2 
0.0 -----------...---
Small States Large Countries 
Source: IMF staff estimates 
*Calculated as (Export+ Imports)/ (2xGDP) 
Economic Vulnerability 
The Commonwealth Vulnerability Index (Atkins et al., 2000) and the 
University of Malta Vulnerability Index (Briguglio and Galea, 2003), 
which both contain components reflecting trade openness and export 
concentration, indicate that small states tend to be more economically 
vulnerable than larger countries. 
Output Volatility 
Output in small states tends to be more volatile due to the compounding 
of certain characteristics,6 including (i) their greater openness exposes 
them more to changes in world market prices and world demand; (ii) 
their lack of economic and export diversification leaves them more 
exposed to terms of trade shocks/ and (iii) natural disasters can impact 
the whole country rather than a single area. 
6 Easterly and Kraay (2000) argue that while small states do have more volatile growth 
rates due to greater exposure of terms of trade shocks because they are more open, openness 
has a positive net impact on growth. 
7 Shocks can be both positive and negative, though in both cases they raise output volatility. 
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Figure 3 
Fiscal Volatility in Small States 
(Calculated as the Standard Deviation for 1990-2004) 
Total Revenue and Grants Total Government Expenditure 
Small States Large Countries Small states Large Countries 
Source: IMF staff estimates 
Economic volatility in small states can also be heightened by the lack of 
intracountry fiscal transfers that larger countries benefit from. For 
instance, a region or state in a large country hit by a localised recession 
or natural disaster would benefit from fiscal transfers from the rest of 
the country.8 
The higher economic volatility in small states leads to more volatility in 
government revenues and expenditures than in large countries (Figure 
3). This is despite the fact that these larger emerging-market countries 
tend to have more volatile revenues than advanced countries (IMF, 2003). 
Greater volatility can affect public debt because revenue shortfalls and 
expenditure overruns are more likely when a government is hit by a 
shock. Volatility in government revenue and expenditure in small states 
can lead to a more volatile fiscal balance that further reinforces 
macroeconomic instability. 
Narrow Human Resources Base 
Narrow human resources in small states, often accentuated by migration 
leading to skill and brain drains, tends to limit capacity in both public 
and private sectors; this can inflate wages because skilled (and sometimes 
also semiskilled) labour is scarce (Table 2). Winters and Martins (2004) 
found that wages tend to be higher is smaller countries, even after 
controlling for income levels. The brain drain can render providing 
specialised government services, such as regulation, court systems, social 
welfare, health and education, more difficult. The limited institutional 
capacity of small states is accentuated in poorer African countries and 
multi-island states in the Pacific. 
8 Alesina and Spolaore (2003) refer to this as regional 'insurance". 
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Table 2 
Wage Disadvantage of Very Small* and Small States* 
(Percentage Deviation from those in the Median Economy) 
Area of Cost Micro Very Small* Small* 
Unskilled wages average 60.1 31.6 6.6 
Semi-skilled wages average 22.4 12.1 2.6 
Skilled wages average 38.0 20.3 4.3 
Source: Winters and Martins (2004) 
*A very small state is one with a population of 200,000 or less, and a small state is one with 
a population of no more than 4 million population. The median for population is 10 million. 
Governance and Transparency 
For lower-income small states, in particular, improving governance and 
the quality of institutions has been shown to raise the public debt 
threshold that countries can safely sustain without experiencing debt 
distress. This is particularly important because numerous low-income 
states tend to have higher public and external debt and worse 
governance. There is also evidence that better institutional quality is 
associated in emerging markets with more prudent borrowing and a 
more countercyclical response of fiscal policy (IMF, 2003). 
Briguglio et al. (2006) claim that good governance, related to the rule of 
law and property rights, is imperative for an economy to function 
properly and withstand adverse shocks. In this regard, good governance 
can support economic resilience. Brautigam and Woolcock (2001) argue 
that since small countries are more vulnerable, the quality of their 
institutions matters more than in large countries. They maintain that 
small states with high-quality institutions have less growth volatility 
and are more likely to benefit from higher rates of economic growth. 
According to the World Bank's indicator on government effectiveness, 
small states span the whole governance spectrum - and they do not fare 
worse than larger developing states - but they have more to gain by 
improving governance because their public debt tends to be higher.9 
The World Bank's indicator on government effectiveness, reflects the 
capacity of government to formulate and implement policies, with higher 
values corresponding to better governance. In particular, it assesses the 
quality of public services, the quality of bureaucracy, the competence of 
civil servants, the independence of civil servants from political pressures 
anJ the credibility of the government's commitment to policies. 
9 The indicators are constructed using an unobserved components methodology and surveys 
described in detail by Kaufmann et al. (2006). The indicators are subject to a standard error, 
so precise country rankings should not be inferred from the data. 
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Transparency can support the fiscal adjustment required in many small 
states by creating wider public support and understanding of government 
policies (Daniel et al., 2006). In addition, transparency can help investors 
make better-informed assessments on risk and lending to small states, 
and can reassure financial markets and donors on the government's fiscal 
goals. Enhanced transparency is particularly important for small states, 
because they are at an informational disadvantage compared to large 
countries - foreign investors tend to know less about them -while at the 
same time they are more open and dependent on foreign capital. In an 
increasingly globalised world, small states need to compete with large 
countries that investors are more familiar with, that benefit from economies 
of scale, and that suffer less from isolation. 
Improving governance can support donor aid by enhancing credibility 
on the use of official development assistance, including grants, which 
are particularly substantial for small states, especially for those in Africa 
and the Pacific states that have weak governance. 
In small states, due to their small internal markets, private and public 
monopolies are common, and this can lead to abuse and corruption. 
Greater political centralisation and the larger role and size of the public 
sector in small economies compared to large ones often leads to political 
interventions and rent seeking in the supply of utilities and other public 
services, such as housing. 
Exchange Rate Regimes 
One striking feature common to 35 of the 42 small states is a fixed 
exchange rate regime, which often implies some degree of monetary 
integration with a large currency area, such as the US. dollar or the euro 
(see Appendix, Table Al). This leads to limited room for the endogenous 
determination of interest and inflation rates, and consequently less 
control over domestic output.10 Views vary as to whether a fixed regime 
tends to reduce or increase incentives for high public debt. When they 
fix their exchange rates, small states would be giving up an adjustment 
tool that is especially useful when they are hit by an external shock; this 
may be leading them to use fiscal policy to smooth out economic 
fluctuations, resulting in debt accumulation. Some recent research 
suggests that a fixed exchange rate regime can worsen the fiscal position. 
For example Tornell and Velasco (2000), Alberola and Molina (2004) and 
Duttagupta and Tolosa (2006) find that countries with fixed exchange 
10 One reason many small states may chose a fixed exchange rate regime is due to the 
more limited institutional capacity that exist in both the public and private sectors. Flexible 
exchange rate regimes tend to require more sophisticated monetary policy, while private 
agents can benefit from knowledge on how to deal with exchange rate risk, such as hedging. 
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rates had worse fiscal outcomes than those with flexible exchange rates. 
Sahay (2005) produces similar findings for the Caribbean countries. The 
rationale here is that fixed regimes encourage lax fiscal discipline and 
increase public debt because the cost of these policies-the inflation tax -
can be postponed to the future.11 
However, the more traditional view is that, appropriately implemented, 
fixed exchange rate regimes can encourage more fiscal discipline, because 
expansionary fiscal policies are discouraged as these will eventually lead 
to the collapse of the peg. Vella (2005) finds that small states with hard 
pegs tend to be associated with a higher degree of fiscal discipline when 
compared to countries with a floating exchange rate regime, arguing that 
lax fiscal policy could result in a rundown in reserves that will ultimately 
jeopardise the sustainability of the peg. In addition, eventual punishment 
of the authorities for lax fiscal policy under fixed rates may be more severe 
than under flexible rates (Sun, 2003). If the fixed exchange rate regime is 
designed so that it enhances economic and monetary integration with 
major trading partners - in other words, by pegging to or adopting the 
currency of a main trading partner - it may actually help stabilise growth 
and reduce transaction costs (Armstrong and Read, 1998). Moreover, if 
the anchor currency country and the small state share a relatively 
synchronous business cycle and terms of trade shocks, the policies of the 
anchor country should also support growth in the small state. All these 
considerations would be conducive to lowering public debt. 
3. Fiscal Indicators 
For the purpose of this study, data on gross public and external public 
debt for the small states was obtained from the IMF World Economic 
Outlook database, staff reports, and country economists. The broadest 
possible coverage of government liabilities was aimed for, although often 
only general government or central government debt was available.12 
Government Expenditures 
Small states tend to have bigger governments than large countries, as 
measured by both average total expenditure and most expenditure 
subcategories (Figure 4). In 2004 total expenditures in small states were 
11 This is also referred to as the intertemporal free-riding problem; it assumes that the 
government can borrow to finance its deficit and has enough reserves in the near term to 
maintain the fixed exchange rate. 
12 Due to different national definitions of the public sector and the various sources used to 
collect the data, there are some definitional fiscal data issues, especially with the public 
debt data. However, this problem is not unique to this cross-country study (see IMF, 2003). 
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Figure 4 
Expenditures for Small and Large States (1990-2004) 
(Percent of GDP, Averages) 
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about 3'/ percent of GDP on average, although there has been a marginal 
downward trend since the early 1990s, largely due to a decline in capital 
spending. Both components of total expenditure, current expenditures 
and capital spending, were higher in smaller states than in large ones. 
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Within current spending, most subcategories were higher in small states, 
including spending on goods and services and on salaries and wages. 
Only interest spending on government debt was higher in large states, 
because they borrow more on commercial terms and from international 
capital markets; small states tend to borrow more on concessional terms. 
There is considerable variation among small states in the level and 
composition of expenditures, more than among large countries. For 
example, at the high end, total expenditures in 2000-2004 in Sao Tome 
and Principe and in the Federated States of Micronesia were about 70 
percent of GDP and in the Seychelles about 51 percent (see Appendix, 
Table A3 ). At the low end, total expenditures in 2000-2004 were only 
about 20 percent of GDP in the Bahamas and Equatorial Guinea, well 
below the average for large countries. Capital spending for the same 
period was as high as 31 percent of GDP in Sao Tome and Principe and 
as low as 2 percent in Jamaica. In fact, the standard deviation of 
expenditure and most expenditure subcategories, except for interest 
payments, was higher in small states than in large countries. 
Revenues 
Revenues in small states have trended up since 2001, and on average these 
states have higher revenues and grants than larger states, in part due to 
the revenue from customs or international trade taxes (Figure 5).13 Small 
states with particularly substantial revenues are Gabon (largely due to oil 
revenues), Seychelles and Malta. 
The smallest island states obtained more revenues from international trade 
taxes than mainland small states (Figure 6). Landlocked small states 
obtained the highest proportion of their revenue from customs taxes, but 
for three of the four landlocked states, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, 
this was due to the revenue-sharing arrangement of the South African 
Customs Union (SACU).14 
However, the share of revenue from international trade taxes for small 
states has been declining since 1990 with ongoing world trade 
liberalisation,15 though in many small states the introduction of VAT 
and consumption-based taxes has more than offset the decline. VAT 
13 Easterly and Rebelo (1993), using cross-section data for 1970-88, found that the revenue 
share of taxes on international trade is negatively related to population even when 
controlling for inrome ;mrl tr;irlP sh;irP TJ8ing rlnt;i for ?004, Borg (?006) ill8o finrl8 tlw 
~roportion of trade taxes is negatively related to country size. 
4 SACU customs revenue is redistributed among all the SACU member states, including 
South Africa. 
15 For estimates of the impact of trade preference erosion on Caribbean countries' fiscal 
balances, see IMF (2007): Chapter III . 
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Figure 5 
Revenues and Grants in Small and Large States (1990-2005) 
(Percent of GDP, Averages) 
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Figure 6 
International Trade Taxes for Small States (1990-2004) 
(Percent of Total Revenue, Averages) 
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has been implemented in Pacific islands, such as Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
and Samoa; some Caribbean islands, such as Antigua and Barbuda, 
Barbados, Dominica, and St Vincent and the Grenadines; and in several 
small states in Africa, such as Cape Verde, Botswana, and Gabon. 
Reflecting their greater openness and reliance on aid, small states have 
higher external grants than the large countries, though grants have 
declined. Some islands in the Pacific received very large amounts of 
grants; for 2000-04 grants averaged about 45 percent of GDP in 
Micronesia, 12 percent in the Solomon Islands and 11 percent in Samoa. 
Other low-income or lower middle-income small states that received a 
substantial amount in grants were Bhutan, Cape Verde, and Guinea 
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Bissau. Nevertheless, since 1990 there has been an overall decline in 
grants to small states, particularly to several Pacific island states and 
African countries, such as Cape Verde, Comoros, and Lesotho. 
Fiscal Balances 
As measured by the primary balance, fiscal policies have on average 
been more expansionary in small states than in large countries (Figure 
7). If interest payments are included, however, large countries have larger 
fiscal deficits. The primary balance, excluding interest payments, is a 
better measure of the government's fiscal effort than the overall fiscal 
balance because interest payments are predetermined by the level of 
borrowing from previous years. 
For many small states, particularly in Asia Pacific and the Western 
Hemisphere, the worsening in the primary balance came in conjunction 
with a slowdown in growth for the late 1990s through 2001, though this 
also impacted large countries (Figure 8). The fiscal position of both 
groups has improved since 2002. 
Among small states that witnessed a more pronounced deterioration in 
their primary balance positions starting in about 2000 were Bhutan, Fiji, 
the Maldives, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu in Asia Pacific; Antigua 
and Barbuda, Belize, Grenada, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, and Suriname 
in the Western Hemisphere; and Cape Verde, Comoros, Guinea Bissau, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe and Swaziland in Africa. 
Public Debt 
As a consequence of persistent fiscal deficits and to some degree poorer 
growth, small states have accumulated higher public debt than large 
states in the sample. Debt above 50 to 60 percent of GDP is generally 
considered high.16 In 2005 average debt for small states stood at about 
84 percent of GDP, after peaking at 95 percent in 2002. For 2000-04, 13 
small states had very high debt of over 90 percent of GDP, and 15 had 
high debt (Table 3).17 For those with relatively low public debt, half have 
benefited from revenues from minerals or oil (Bahrain, Botswana, 
Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, Qatar and Trinidad and Tobago), and one 
(Micronesia) receives a very high amount of external grants. 
16 Eastern Caribbean Currency Union and euro-area countries aim to have public debt no 
higher than 60 percent of GDP. Sahay (2005) classifies Caribbean country public debt as 
low to medium if debt is below 50 percent of GDP, high if it is between 50 and 90 percent, 
and very high if it is above 90 percent. This study adopts this classification. 
17 Bhutan's external debt mostly reflects debt from India to develop hydropower stations 
(electricity is exported to India), rather than fiscal deficits. 
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Figure 7 
Fiscal Indicators for Small and Large States 
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Estimates for domestic debt reveal that small states on average have a 
substantial and slightly growing amount of domestic debt, about 26 
percent of GDP in 2005, similar to levels in large states. Due to a lack of 
data on domestic debt, domestic debt-to-GDP ratios for most countries 
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Figure 8 
Average Real GDP Growth: 1990-2005 
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are calculated as a residual: total public debt-to-GDP minus total external 
debt-to-GDP. Thus, domestic debt ratios are only estimates and may 
sometimes reflect valuation effects due to exchange rate movements, 
since public debt is generally quoted in domestic currency and external 
debt in US dollars. Several small African states have seen domestic debt 
rise since 1990, among them Cape Verde, Djibouti, Gambia, Mauritius 
and Seychelles. Domestic debt also rose in Pacific Island states, such as 
Fiji, Solomon Islands and Tonga; and in several Caribbean countries, 
for instance, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Jamaica, and St Kitts and 
Nevis. 
Compared to large states, small states in general had more external debt. 
Within the small states, low-income and African countries tend to have 
very high external debt levels, for example, Comoros, Gambia, Guinea 
Bissau and Sao Tome and Principe, which are all highly indebted poor 
countries (HIPCs). However, some middle-income African countries 
(Cape Verde, Djibouti and Seychelles) also have substantial external debt, 
as do several Caribbean countries, such as Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana (another HIPC case) and St Lucia. Since 
1990 some Asia Pacific countries, including Bhutan and the Solomon 
Islands, have also seen external debt rise. 
Though since 1990 the average concessionality of total external debt has 
declined for low and middle-income states that are small, it is still 
significantly higher than for all low and middle-income countries.18 
18 This is according to World Bank data. Total external debt also includes private as well 
as public external debt, although private external debt is limited for small states. Data on 
debt concessionality was unavailable for Antigua and Barbuda, Namibia and Suriname. 
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Table 3 
Total Public Debt Levels in Small States 
(Percent of GDP, average 2000-04) 
Low to Medium 
Debt: (0% to 50%) 
The Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Botswana 
Equatorial Guinea 
Estonia 
Fiji 
Maldives 
Micronesia 
Namibia 
Qatar 
Slovenia 
Swaziland 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Vanuatu 
High Debt Very High Debt 
(50% to 90%) (More than 90%) 
Barbados 
Bhutan 
Cape Verde 
Djibouti 
Gabon 
Grenada 
Lesotho 
Malta 
Mauritius 
Papua New Guinea 
Samoa 
St Lucia 
St Vincent/Grenadines 
Suriname 
Ton a 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Belize 
Comoros 
Cyprus 
Dominica 
Gambia 
Guinea Bissau 
Guyana 
Jamaica 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Seychelles 
Solomon Islands 
St Kitts and Nevis 
Source: IMF staff calculations based on data from national authorities 
4. Empirical Evidence 
The higher spending and debt of small states, discussed above, suggests 
there should be a negative relationship between country size and size of 
government, and between country size and levels of public and external 
debt. This section lays out some groundwork empirical analysis to test 
the robusb1ess of these propositions and examine the role of several factors 
highlighted in Section 2 in determining the size of government and the 
amount of public debt, with a focus on government size and debt. 
The modelling follows Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) but uses more recent 
data and focuses more on small states.19 We use total government 
expenditure and the economic classification of expenditure subcategories 
to measure the size of government. We also extend the approach by 
introducing public debt as a dependent variable.20 The country sample 
consists of both large and small developing countries (see Appendix, 
Tables Al and A2) but the focus is on small states. 
Table A4 (in Appendix) describes summary statistics for all variables 
used in the analysis for 2000-04, wilh averages useu for mosl of Lhe 
19 Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) reveal a negative relationship between the size of govern-
ment and the size of a country. 
20 The model specification docs not take into account the hypothesis lhal counl1 y si.1.e anJ 
fiscal outcomes may be simultaneously determined. 
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fiscal variables. For the cross-sectional specifications, OLS regressions 
are presented for 2000-04.21 Because heteroskedasticity is suspected in 
the error term of the equations, robust standard errors were used to 
calculate the t-statistics.22 
The Size of Government 
OLS regressions are presented for various measures of government size 
on the log of population (Table 4). Population size is found to be 
significantly negatively correlated with government expenditure and 
all its components. This relationship is further confirmed in the scatter 
plot diagram (Figure 9). 
Table 4 
Simple OLS Regressions for the Size of Government, 2000-04 
Total Capital Wages Goods 
Expenditure Expenditure and Salaries and Services 
Log population -1.62 -0.78 -0.80 -0.58 
(3.39)*** (3.74)*** (5.40)*** (2.71)*** 
Constant 46.14 12.93 15.64 10.38 
(10.78)*** (6.19)*** (11.46)*** (5.11)*** 
Observations 67 67 63 56 
R-squared 0.17 0.16 0.29 0.11 
Absolute value oft statistics in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1 % 
Figure 9 
Total Government Expenditure as Percent of GDP and Population 
i;'; 80 
.2 
'8 70 
!'.:: ... 
~ 60 x 
':...., e .. r "'.q 
• :I ..... : 
•• • • .,.... l 
•'!. • .. .. 
~ 
~ 
50 
0 40 E-
30 .. .: e 
20 .... 
10 -
0 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Log of Population 
71 Five-yeal' averages wel'e used Lo eliminate Lhe impact of the business cycle. OLS regres-
sions were also run for 1990-94, 1995-99, and 1997-04. See Medina Cas and Ota (2008) for 
the full results. 
22 Breusch-Pagan tests revealed the presence of heteroskedasticity in the variance of the 
error terms. To correct this, the Eicker-White method, or robust standard errors, was uti-
lised to recalculate the t-statistics. 
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Table 5 
Correlation Matrix 
LP LPD LPI GVN TOT ERD TRO 
Log of population 1.00 
Log of population density -0.02 1.00 
Log of per capita income -0.27 0.06 1.00 
Governance -0.18 0.14 0.68 1.00 
Change in terms of trade 0.11 -0.10 0.03 -0.35 1.00 
Exchange rate dummy -0.69 0.05 0.20 0.13 0.06 1.00 
Trade openness -0.55 0.14 0.19 0.26 0.03 0.38 1.00 
Note: The terms of trade and exchange rate variables will be used in the debt regressions 
Additional control variables were considered to augment the OLS 
regressions in order to produce more robust results. These are: 
• population density since this can impact the size of government as 
higher congestion may raise the cost of some public goods and 
services, lead to market failures and environmental pressures. 
However, a more geographically disperse population may raise the 
cost of delivery of some government services. 
• per-capita income because higher GDP per capita, or more developed 
economies, tend to have greater levels of expenditure and revenues 
as a share of output (Wagner's law). 
• government effectiveness (governance index) because this may lead 
to lower public expenditures. 
• trade openness (measured as imports and exports of goods and 
services over GDP) since openness and vulnerability to external shocks 
may require a larger government to provide a stabilising role in the 
economy. 
A correlation check on these control variables was undertaken in order 
to avoid multicollinearity. The results are presented in the correlation 
matrix shown as Table 5. Trade openness and population appear to be 
highly negatively correlated, so we decided to drop trade openness as a 
control variable. Because governance and per-capita income are highly 
positively correlated, only governance was used in the equations. 
Governance is generally acknowledged to support successful economic 
development; in other words an improvement in governance tends to 
raise per-capita income. 
WhPn thP <lrlrlition<ll inrlPp1mrl0nt v<lri<lhl0s w0r0 ind11rl0rl in th0 
regression, only governance was found to be significantly negatively 
related, and this only with capital expenditure, indicating that better 
governance leads to lower levels of capital spending, most likely due to 
more efficient use of public resources (Table 6). 
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Table 6 
Determinants of Size of Government 
(OLS Regressions for 2000-04) 
Total Capital Wages 
Expenditure Expenditure and Salaries 
Log of population -2.24 -1.01 -0.55 
(3.43)*** (3.80)*** (2.04)** 
Governance -1.05 -2.14 0.53 
(0.51) (2.45)** (0.76) 
Constant 46.44 13.55 15.51 
(10.33)*** (6.24)*** (10.80)*** 
Observations 66 66 62 
R-squared 0.18 0.22 0.30 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
Goods 
and Services 
-1.00 
(2.09)** 
0.39 
(0.49) 
10.24 
(4.92)*** 
55 
0.10 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1 % 
Public and External Debt 
Table 7 presents OLS regressions of public and external debt with respect 
to population size. The correlation is negative, but not statistically 
significant. This relationship is also presented as a scatter diagram (Figure 
10), which shows that there are a few outliers. 
In order to investigate what other factors may be important in 
determining levels of public and external debt, we add more independent 
variables to the OLS regressions. These are: 
• a dummy variable equal to one is included if a country has a de facto 
fixed exchange rate regime in order to determine whether a fixed 
exchange rate regime worsens or improves the fiscal stance.23 
• the change in terms of trade of goods and services since a deterioration 
in the terms of trade of goods and services, or a negative terms of 
trade shock, would worsen the fiscal stance and raise debt by lowering 
government revenues. 
• population density as this may raise the cost of public goods and lead 
to more government borrowing, and thus higher public debt. 
• the index of government effectiveness or governance because better 
use of public resources and better government policies that enhance 
resilience may lead to less over borrowing and debt. 
23 This has been done by Tornell and Velasco (2000), Alberola and Molina (2004) and 
Duttagupta and Tolosa (2006). A de facto fixed exchange rate regime is defined as a mon-
etary policy that uses an exchange rate anchor; this can range from an exchange rate ar-
rangement with no separate legal tender (a monetary union) to a crawling peg. 
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Table 7 
Simple OLS Regressions for Public and External Debt, 2000-04 
Log population 
Constant 
Observations 
R-sguared 
Gross Public Debt 
-5.29 
(1.52) 
125.77 
(3.59)*** 
67 
0.03 
External Public Debt 
-5.17 
(1.43) 
95.60 
(2.65)** 
66 
0.03 
Absolute value oft statistics in parentheses 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1 % 
Figure 10 
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As can be observed in the correlation matrix (Table 5) most of these 
variables are not correlated. Only the exchange rate regime dummy is 
highly negatively correlated with population due to the fact that smaller 
states tend to have fixed exchange rate regimes. 
The OLS estimation results with the significant independent variables 
display evidence of a negative relation between country size and gross 
public and external public debt in 2000-04 (Table 8), though the 
relationship is not as robust as that between country size and size of 
govermnenl. Populalion Jensily was nol a significant determinant of 
public and external debt, so it was dropped from the regression. The 
coefficients on governance are negative and significant implying that 
higher governance scores are linked to reduced levels of both public 
and external debt. 
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Table 8 
Determinants of Gross Public and External Debt 
(OLS Regressions for 2000-04) 
Log of population 
Governance 
Gross Public Debt 
-18.08 
(2.13)** 
-57.42 
(2.70)*** 
Change in terms of trade -5.12 
(2.56)** 
-77.25 
(1.75)* 
280.00 
Exchange rate dummy 
Constant 
Observations 
R-squared 
(2.86)*** 
63 
0.42 
External Public Debt 
-16.41 
(1.72)* 
-63.03 
(2.72)*** 
-4.67 
(2.11)** 
-66.38 
(1.32) 
230.321 
(2.08)** 
62 
0.39 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1 % 
There is some evidence that a fixed exchange rate regime is associated 
with lower public debt, thus supporting the traditional view that a fixed 
rate regime can increase fiscal discipline. However, the sample is biased 
toward small states that have fixed regimes. 
The coefficients on the change in the terms of trade are negative and 
significant suggesting a worsening in the terms of trade may have led to 
higher public and external debt. 24 
5. Policy Considerations for Fiscal Adjustment and Resilience 
As confirmed by the empirical analysis, small states tend to have 
relatively bigger governments and there is some evidence that they also 
tend to suffer from comparatively high public and external debt. 
Although small states have certain structural characteristics that explain 
their higher spending and public debt, this section first argues that fiscal 
adjustment for many small states will help them withstand their inherent 
economic vulnerability and build economic resilience by lowering high 
public debt. We then discuss how a large fiscal adjustment can enhance 
their economic growth rates, and thus, also resilience. Finally, we put 
forth measures that support fiscal adjustment and resilience building in 
small states, such as expenditure cuts, revenue preservation and 
governance improvements. 
24 Many small states, particularly Caribbean ones, suffered a negative terms of trade shock 
with the erosion of trade preferences during the 2000-04 period. 
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Withstanding Vulnerability 
Fiscal adjustment in small states can enhance their economic resilience 
by correcting their weaker fiscal positions and help them withstand their 
economic vulnerability resulting from their susceptibility to shocks. Low 
public debt and a sound fiscal position builds resilience by giving 
policymakers flexibility to respond countercyclically to shocks or 
downturns (Daniel et al., 2006). Expansionary fiscal policy may also 
exacerbate economic volatility by, for example, causing bouts of fiscal 
expansion and contraction. A large government is not a prerequisite for 
countercyclical fiscal policy, because it is the impact of the change in 
government spending and taxes on aggregate demand that helps to 
stabilise the economy. 
Numerous small countries need to reduce their public debt to ensure 
debt sustainability, though the fact that they borrow more externally on 
concessional terms at lower interest rates than large countries may make 
their somewhat higher public debt more sustainable. However, any 
slowdown in growth rates, caused for example by the continued 
unwinding of preferential trade access for small states, will have a 
negative impact on their debt dynamics. The higher concessionality of 
the debt of small states also implies that the present value of debt should 
also be used in targeting public debt ratios. 
It is important that small states attempt to support economic resilience 
by minimising fiscal rigidities so that fiscal policy is adaptable enough 
to respond effectively to shocks. Examples of fiscal rigidities that some 
small states may be particularly vulnerable to are high public 
employment that raises the wage bill; revenues earmarked for certain 
expenditures, such as a big capital project; and a large proportion of 
non-discretionary expenditure, such as entitlement programmes. 
Often fiscal adjustment is more important than monetary policy when 
small states respond to changes in output. As monetary policy options 
are limited because most small states have a fixed exchange rate regime, 
fiscal policy is one of the few tools available to them to respond 
countercyclically to shocks. The effectiveness of monetary policy is 
further limited in small open states with no capital controls because 
domestic interest rates are largely determined by world interest rates. 
Growth Suppnrt 
Fiscal adjushnent can also build economic resilience and help small states 
recover from negative external shocks through growth support, 
crowding in investment and reducing uncertainty. Fiscal discipline can 
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help reverse the crowding out of private investment and help spur 
private-sector-led growth in many small states. This can be important 
because in small states the public sector tends to have a larger economic 
role. It is important to promote private investment for economic and 
export diversification in small states, which in turn can help mitigate 
their vulnerability to shocks. Loose fiscal policy can also harm economic 
growth if it leads to, for example, unsustainably high debt and creates 
investor uncertainty about how the situation will be rectified. 
Furthermore, there is some evidence that growth is higher in small states 
with smaller government and lower public debt (Figure 11). Since about 
1993, high-growth small states on average have had lower revenues and 
grants, lower expenditures, stronger fiscal balances and lower public 
debt than medium-growth and low-growth small states.25 These high-
growth small states would be more economically resilient to negative 
external shocks, in part due to their more favourable fiscal positions. 
There is evidence that a fiscal adjustment, especially a large one, may 
have an expansionary impact on the economy due to improvements in 
private investment and consumption (Tsibouris et al., 2006). 
Expansionary fiscal contractions have been found to be particularly 
connected with high-debt countries because the risk premium on interest 
rates declines and confidence rises when the government default risk is 
lower and there is less probability that taxes will go up (Perotti, 1999). 
A study of episodes of large fiscal adjustment in small states confirms 
that in most cases, growth actually rose (Table 9). An episode of large 
fiscal adjustment is defined as occurring when the average primary 
balance as a percent of GDP for a three-year period was at least 10 
percentage points of GDP greater than the average primary balance for 
the previous three-year period.26 
To limit the impact of exogenous events, adjustment episodes involving 
oil exporters were excluded starting in 1999 when oil prices began to 
rise. During the period examined, 1990 to 2004, there were 12 episodes 
involving nine small states.27 In 67 percent of the episodes of large fiscal 
25 High-growth small states in the sample are defined as the 10 countries that enjoyed the 
highest growth rates on average from 1990 to 2005. Low-growth small states are the 10 
countries that had the lowest average growth rates from 1990 to 2005. The other 22 states 
in the middle are medium-growth small states. The high-growth states are Bahrain, Be-
lize, Bhutan, Botswana, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Maldives, Mauritius, Qatar, and 
TriniJaJ anJ Tobago. The low-growth states are the Bahamas, Barbados, Comoros, 
Djibouti, Dominica, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Jamaica, Micronesia and Slovenia. The me-
dium-growth states are all the rest. 
26 Two of the episodes were for two-year periods. 
27 See Appendix, Table AS, for a list of countries that experienced large fiscal adjustments, 
with more details about the episodes. 
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Figure 11 
Growth and Fiscal Indicators (1990-2004) for 
Low-Growth, Medium-Growth and High-Growth Small States 
(Percent of GDP) 
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Table 9 
Episodes of Large Fiscal Adjustment in Small States 
(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated) 
Primary Fiscal Revenue Expend-
Balance Balance iture 
Growth 
(%) 
Average -0.6 -4.3 41.7 46.1 3.5 
Median 0.3 -1.0 42.2 45.4 4.2 
Average change 12.1 12.5 2.6 -9.9 1.3 
Median change 11.4 12.1 3.4 -6.5 0.7 
Percentage of Large Fiscal Adjustment cases (out of 12 cases) 
Where primary and Where revenues Where Where growth 
fiscal balances improved rose expenditure fell rose 
100% 59% 92% 67% 
Source: IMF staff estimates 
adjustment, economic growth increased and the average change in 
growth was 1.3 percent. In fact, in only one episode was average growth 
negative.28 Fiscal adjustment is often part of a comprehensive reform 
effort. In come cases, changes in the political and social environment 
and structural reforms may have also impacted the growth outcome.29 
Adjustment and Resilience Measures 
The most effective way to achieve fiscal adjustment is to reduce spending. 
The majority of episodes of large fiscal adjustment in small states 
involved hefty expenditure cuts in both current and capital spending; a 
rise in revenue was less frequent and less pronounced in magnitude. 
Moreover, there is evidence that curtailing current spending, especially 
transfers and subsidies, while maintaining capital spending, supports 
more sustainable and durable adjustments (Daniel et al., 2006). Small 
states should also save by combining overlapping functions of 
government and carefully prioritising expenditures. 
The small-state fiscal data also suggests that reducing current 
expenditures in goods and services, transfers and subsidies, and wages 
is associated with higher growth and greater resilience. High-growth 
small states tended to have lower spending in these three categories 
and higher capital spending than medium and low-growth small states 
(see Figure 11). Nonetheless, caution should be used in assessing 
28 This was for Seychelles durmg 2003-04, a penod which comc1ded with the Indian Ocean 
tsunami at the end of 2004. 
29 For example, during 2003-04 in the Solomon Islands, the fiscal adjustment episode coin-
cided with an improvement in the security situation which had a positive impact on the 
large pick-up in growth. 
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employment levels in small states since they also reflect the absence of 
economies of scale. The need for appropriate social safety nets for the 
vulnerable when implementing fiscal adjustment should also be 
considered. 
The relatively lower revenues in high-growth small states compared to 
other small states cautions against raising revenues too much to achieve 
fiscal adjustment unless revenues are particularly low. Nonetheless, as 
part of prudent fiscal policy, small states need to monitor sources of 
revenues carefully and broaden the tax base. The trend over the last few 
years has been toward gradual liberalisation of international trade and 
a reduction in tariffs, which has been reflected in a decline in international 
trade tax revenues for small states. In order to maintain revenue, many 
small states need to strengthen administrative capacity and implement 
further domestic tax system reforms, such as relying more on VAT, sales 
tax, and a low flat tax on imports. 
Small states can also overcome some of their size constraints in the 
delivery of certain government services-while at the same time also 
cutting spending- by enhancing regional cooperation with other small 
states or larger neighbours (Briguglio, Persaud, and Stern, 2006). This 
allows small states to pool the fixed costs of providing public goods and 
services. Examples of such regional arrangements are the Eastern 
Caribbean Central Bank, the Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications 
Authority and the air traffic control system in the Pacific. 
The empirical results presented in this paper suggest that improving 
government effectiveness may also help small states reduce public and 
external debt and thus support fiscal adjustment and greater economic 
resilience. This means that many small states should strive to improve 
their institutional capacity to devise and implement government policies 
and improve the quality of public services and the civil service.Weaknesses 
in the delivery of government services, combined with the fact that small 
states tend to have larger governments, may well lead to over borrowing 
and higher public debt in small states. Measures that enhance policy 
credibility, such as increasing the accountability of the government to fiscal 
targets, regular publication of economic data and improving transparency, 
should also help raise government effectiveness. 
Technical assistance can improve governance by increasing the capacity 
of government to formulate and execute policies to enhance resilience, 
such as those related to fiscal adjustment. Many small emerging-market 
and developing states require technical assistance from the international 
community to help raise the skills of the public labour force and address 
the limited institutional capacity resulting from small size and outward 
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migration. It can also aid reforms to boost transparency and the quality 
of economic data in small states. 
6. Conclusion 
This study shows that government current and capital expenditures and 
revenues, as well as public debt tend to be larger in small states compared 
to larger countries. Within current spending, goods and services and 
wages and salaries are also higher in small states. Small states are likely 
to have large governments due to higher input costs and the inability to 
reap the benefits of economies of scale in providing public goods and 
services. Small states have worse primary balance positions than large 
states, which, when compounded by lower growth, contributes also to 
higher public debt. The tendency for small states to have higher external 
public debt is also a sign of their openness; as they are more reliant on 
foreign capital because domestic markets are limited. 
Empirically, the analysis confirms the findings of Alesina and Wacziarg 
(1998) that government size has a significant negative correlation with 
country size, and also uncovers certain evidence of a negative correlation 
between country size and total public and external debt. Future research 
could usefully investigate whether this negative relationship between 
country size and debt can be extended to a larger sample of developing 
and emerging-market countries. 
In terms of policy implications, first we argue that fiscal adjustment can 
help small states withstand their inherent vulnerability and second, we 
find, like Perotti (1999) and Tsibouris et al. (2006), that a large adjustment 
can support their growth especially when embedded in an economic 
reform programme. While there are structural factors that explain the 
fact that small states have bigger governments and higher debt ratios, a 
healthy fiscal position, including low debt, will give policymakers the 
flexibility to react effectively to shocks and so build economic resilience. 
We find there is some proof that small states that have relatively smaller 
governments and lower public debt tend to grow faster and are thus 
also more resilient to negative shocks. By crowding in private sector 
investment, fiscal adjustment can thus be growth-supportive in small 
states, especially if implemented through cuts in current primary 
spendin3 n1thPr thiln rPvPrnlf' imTPilSPS MorPOVPr,. l)iVPn thP limihltions 
on monetary policy that arise because most small states have fixed 
exchange rate regimes, fiscal policy is crucial to underpinning economic 
resilience because it is one of the few policy options they have to respond 
countercyclically to economic downturns and shocks. 
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This study also presents new evidence linking governance effectiveness 
with lower public and external debt. In this way, improving government 
effectiveness can usefully support fiscal adjustment and build economic 
resilience in small states. Controlling the size and cost of government 
can make government more efficient and more effective in achieving its 
principal functions in the delivery of goods and services. 
This study' s initial findings uphold the traditional view that fiscal 
discipline tends to underpin the credibility of the fixed exchange rate 
regimes. The regression results show that a fixed exchange rate regime 
is correlated with lower public debt in our sample of countries. As long 
as the regime is well designed, a fixed exchange rate can underpin growth 
and reduce transaction costs. In any case, neither a fixed nor a flexible 
exchange rate regime should be used to address the fiscal imbalances 
and high public debt many small states have- these should be addressed 
primarily through fiscal adjustment. 
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Table Al 
List of Small Countries 
Country Region Income level Indebtedness Geography Population Official Exchange Rate Regime (mid-2005) 
(2005) (2005) (Millions) Ty~e Details 
Antigua & Barbuda WH upper middle income less island 0.08 monetary union ECCU, peg to US$ 
Bahamas, The WH high income less island 0.32 fixed peg to US$ 
r.ri 
Bahrain, Kingdom of ME high income less island 0.78 fixed peg to US$ 9 
Barbados WH upper middle income less island 0.27 fixed peg to US$ ~ 
Belize WH upper middle income severely mainland 0.26 fixed peg to US$ r.ri .... 
Bhutan AP lower middle income severely landlocked 0.75 fixed peg to Indian rupee "' ~Botswana AFR upper middle income less landlocked 1.59 fixed peg to basket Ul 
Cape Verde AFR lower middle income moderately island 0.47 fixed peg to euro "' = Comoros AFR low income severely HIPC island 0.59 fixed peg to euro p. .... 
Cy?ruS EUR high income less island 0.83 fixed peg to euro, ERM2+/-15% bands :::>"' rt> 
Dji'.:iouti AFR lower middle income less mainland 0.78 fixed peg to US$ ~ 
<:D Dominica WH upper middle income severely island 0.07 monetary union ECCU, peg to US$ ;;;" 
0 Equatorial Gi.:inea AFR upper middle income less mainland 1.11 monetary union CEMAC, peg to euro .... Ul 
Estonia EUR upper middle income severely mainland 1.35 fixed peg to euro 0 ,...., 
Fiji AP lower middle income less island 0.85 fixed peg to basket m ,., 
Gabon AFR upper middle income severely mainland 1.33 monetary union CEMAC, peg to euro 0 = Gambia AFR low income severely HIPC mainland 1.47 managed float ERM2 of WAMZ + /-15% bands 0 
Grenada WH upper middle income severely island 0.10 monetary union ECCU, peg to US$ §. ,., 
Guinea Bissau AFR low income severely HlPC mainland 1.54 monetary union W AEMU, peg to euro :;::l 
Guyana WH lower middle income severely HIPC mainland 0.75 managed float rt> 
~ Jamaica WH lower middle income moderately island 2.69 managed float :;;· 
Lesotho AFR low income less landlocked 2.32 fixed peg to South African rand = ,., 
Maldives AP lower middle income less island 0.32 fixed peg to US$ rt> 
Malta EUR high income less island 0.39 fixed peg to basket, mostly euro 
Mauritius AFR upper middle income moderately island 1.23 managed float 
Micronesia AP lower middle income less island 0.11 monetary union US$ is legal tender 
Namibia AFR lower middle income less mainland 2.01 fixed £eg to South African rand 
Source: IMF and World Bank (continued next page) 
Country Region Income level 
(2005) 
Papua New Guinea AP low income 
Qatar ME high income 
Samoa AP lower middle income 
Sao Tome & Frincipe AFR low income 
Sevchelles AFR upper middle income 
Sl~venia EUR high income 
Solomon Islards AP low income 
St Kitts and Nevis WH upper middle income 
St Lucia WH upper middle income 
St Vincent & Grens. WH upper middle income 
Su:·iname WH lower middle income 
<D Swaziland AFR lower middle income 
>-"' Tonga AP lower middle income 
Trinidad & Tobago WH upper middle income 
Vanuatu AP lower middle income 
Table Al (continued) 
List of Small Countries 
Indebtedness Geography Population 
(2005) (Millions) 
moderately island 
less mainland 0.76 
severely island 0.18 
severely HIPC island 0.16 
severely island 0.08 
less mainland 2.00 
moderately island 
severely island 0.04 
moderately island 
moderately island 
less mainland 0.50 
less landlocked 1.09 
less island 0.10 
less island 1.29 
less island 0.21 
Source: IMF and World Bank 
Official Exchange Rate Regime (mid-2005) 
Type Details 
5.76 independently floating 
fixed peg to US$ 
fixed peg to basket, + /-2 % bands 
managed float 
fixed peg to basket 
fixed ERM2 of EMU + / -15 % bands 
0.47 fixed peg to basket 
monetary union ECCU, peg to US$ 
0.16 monetary union ECCU, peg to US$ 
0.12 monetary union ECCU, peg to US$ 
managed float previously peg before mid-2004 
fixed peg to South African rand 
fixed peg to basket 
fixed peg to US$ 
fixed adjustable peg 
Table A2 
List of Large Countries 
Country Region Income level Indebtedness Geography Population Official Exchange Rate 
(2005) (2005) (Millions) Regime (mid-2005) 
Argentina WH upper middle income severely mainland 38.37 managed float 
Bolivia WH lower middle income moderately HIPC landlocked 9.01 fixed 
CJ) 
Brazil WH lower middle income severely mainland 183.91 float 3 
China, P.R.: Mainland AP lower middle income less mainland 1307.99 fixed ~ 
Colombia WH lower middle income moderately mainland 44.92 float CJ) 
Cote d'Ivoire AFR low income severely HIPC mainland 17.87 fixed i;r ..... 
K:uador WH lower middle income severely mainland 13.04 fixed 
rt> 
"' 
Egypt ME lower middle income less mainland 72.64 managed float tlJ = 
India AP low income less mainland 1087.12 managed float p.. ..... 
Indonesia AP lower middle income severely island 220.08 managed float ::r rt> 
Jordan ME lower middle income severely mainland 5.56 fixed :J:1 
Lebanon ME upper middle income severely mainland 3.54 fixed :::: 
'° tlJ Nl Mexico WH upper middle income less mainland 105.70 float .... "' Kigeria AFR low income moderately mainland 128.71 managed float 0 '"" Pakistan ME low income moderately mainland 154.79 managed float tr1 ,., 
Peru WH lower middle income severely mainland 27.56 managed float 0 = Philippines AP lower middle income moderately island 81.62 float 0 
P::iland EUR upper middle income moderately mainland 38.56 float §. ,., 
Russia EUR upper middle income moderately mainland 143.90 managed float :::::i 
South Africa AFR upper middle income less mainland 47.21 float rt> ~ Thailand AP lower middle income less mainland 63.69 managed float :;;· 
Turkey EUR upper middle income severely mainland 72.22 float = ,., 
Ckraine EUR lower middle income less mainland 46.99 fixed rt> 
Cruguay WH upper middle income severely mainland 3.44 float 
Venezuela, R.P. WH upper middle income moderately mainland 26.28 fixed 
Source: IMF and World Bank 
Government Expenditure, Debt and Fiscal Adjustment 
TableA3 
The Size of Government and Public Debt in Small States 
(Percent of GDP; average 2000-2004) 
Expenditure Subcategories 
Total Capital Wages Goods Transfers Public 
Expenditure & & & Debt* 
Salaries Services Subsidies 
Antigua and Barbuda 29.4 3.7 11.9 6.0 3.4 129.7 
Bahamas, The 19.5 2.4 9.3 4.1 1.8 33.5 
Bahrain, Kingdom of 28.6 6.3 13.8 4.4 2.7 32.8 
Barbados 37.3 5.5 12.3 3.9 10.8 83.4 
Belize 32.1 11.6 9.4 3.6 1.5 90.6 
Bhutan 43.5 23.9 7.3 9.0 2.3 67.0 
Botswana 38.3 10.2 9.6 n.a. n.a. 7.0 
Cape Verde 35.5 11.8 10.6 1.0 6.6 89.7 
Comoros 21.2 4.8 7.8 4.9 1.2 95.5 
Cyprus 38.0 3.7 9.8 3.0 7.6 102.9 
Djibouti 30.4 4.8 14.3 7.0 3.9 84.9 
Dominica 41.3 9.3 15.6 5.2 5.7 112.7 
Equatorial Guinea 19.4 9.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 19.1 
Estonia 35.9 3.1 7.5 13.5 11.5 5.3 
Fiji 30.3 5.2 11.8 4.3 4.5 47.4 
Gabon 25.1 3.9 6.2 4.0 3.8 65.5 
Gambia 27.6 9.7 5.1 4.2 2.5 226.9 
Grenada 36.6 13.6 10.7 3.9 4.5 87.6 
Guinea Bissau 41.6 13.5 8.6 4.7 4.2 385.4 
Guyana 45.8 12.5 11.3 7.3 7.1 185.4 
Jamaica 35.7 2.1 11.8 n.a. n.a. 127.2 
Lesotho 45.0 9.0 14.3 19.3 6.9 87.7 
Maldives 37.1 12.2 6.5 17.4 0.4 44.0 
Malta 45.9 5.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 85.5 
Mauritius 25.1 4.0 6.5 2.1 8.4 72.5 
Micronesia 68.4 11.5 24.8 27.4 3.7 32.6 
Namibia 35.0 4.4 15.1 6.2 6.0 26.9 
Papua New Guinea 31.9 9.7 9.3 5.3 1.8 66.5 
Qatar 30.2 5.5 7.5 n.a. n.a. 46.6 
Samoa 37.2 13.5 8.6 n.a. n.a. 59.8 
Sao Tome & Principe 68.0 31.1 8.3 7.4 6.1 297.6 
Seychelles 51.3 7.1 14.5 9.9 12.5 181.7 
Slovenia 43.8 2.5 9.4 7.7 19.1 28.5 
Solomon Island 35.2 10.0 10.l 5.7 2.2 99.4 
St Kitts and Nevis 44.9 10.8 15.1 8.8 3.7 160.3 
St Lucia 29.3 7.7 11.0 3.9 4.4 55.7 
St Vincent & Grens. 33.2 6.2 13.9 6.0 4.5 71.1 
Suriname 36.6 3.3 13.9 10.5 6.5 59.5 
Swaziland 32.2 7.1 11.5 7.6 4.8 21.7 
Tonga 28 1.7 12.3 8.4 2.2 67.4 
Trinidad and Tobago 25.0 1.8 7.1 3.0 9.0 31.8 
Vanuatu 24.1 4.0 11.5 4.6 2.4 38.6 
Sources: National authorities, and IMF staff estimates 
* In Botswana, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and Sao Tome there was no domestic 
debt data, so total public debt equals total external public debt. 
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Table A4 
Summary Statistics and Sources for the Data1 
Descri_etion No. Mean StdDev. Min Max Source 
Log of population (2000) 67 7.88 2.61 3.74 14.06 IMF 
Log of per capita income (2000) 67 -6.14 1.09 -8.75 -3.56 IMF 
Log of population density (2000) 67 3.99 1.58 0.14 7.15 IMF 
Governance (2002 66 -0.07 0.65 -1.42 1.38 World Bank 
Trade openness (2000)2 67 93.88 41.26 27.94 200.53 IMF/World Bank 
Change in terms of trade 64 1.10 5.44 -6.94 28.21 IMF 
Dummy exchange rates3 67 IMF 
Total expenditure2 67 33.38 10.15 18.10 68.41 IMF 
Capital expenditure2 67 6.78 5.16 1.00 31.06 IMF 
Wages and salaries2 63 9.40 3.83 1.25 24.85 IMF 
Goods and services2 56 5.88 4.71 0.75 27.37 IMF 
Gross public debt2 67 84.06 79.80 5.33 550.23 IMF 
External 12ublic debt2 66 55.03 80.88 3.09 550.23 IMFC:World Bank 
1 Five-year averages (2000-2004) unless otherwise noted. 
2 As a percentage of GDP. 
3 For de facto exchange rate regime 
Table AS 
Episodes of Large Fiscal Adjustment in Small States 
(Period Averages in Percent of GDP, unless otherwise Indicated) 
OI oil oil k ;;; .E "'"' » e- OI OI OI :a oil"' k OI oil"' ..c: ::s OI ·~ J:j u ::I"' ;;; <Jl OI ...... ..., "' ~ ..... i:: .. u i:: ..... r; ~ ~ i:: i:: "' s ~ ~3 ..... oi ·~ "'·~ ..., ·~ ::s k OI i:; ·s.. bl);;; i::"' 0 ~ 8~ .. ;;. .. ..... 0.. ,._ .. ,D 0 OI ·~~ -~ t'\S 01 k 0 x .. ~us ~~ 0 OI 0~ u ;>.; p..~ µ;.;~ C:::l? f-<>LI u c..?cri 
Cape Verde 2002-04 0.5 -2.1 31.1 33.2 12.0 11.2 4.7 1.2 4.8 
Previous Period 1999-01 -10.4 -12.2 27.2 39.4 12.5 9.7 8.2 0.9 8.4 
GuineaBissau 1994-96 -1.1 -7.4 25.8 33.2 16.8 2.0 2.3 3.8 3.8 
Previous Period 1991-93 -12.5 -17.9 28.0 45.9 26.0 4.0 1.9 5.1 2.7 
Malta 1997-99 -1.3 -2.4 45.1 47.5 7.2 n.a n.a n.a 4.1 
Previous Period 1994-96 -11.8 -14.6 33.3 47.9 7.1 n.a n.a n.a 5.2 
Malta 1998-00 3.0 -0.2 45.3 45.5 6.8 n.a n.a n.a 5.8 
Previous Period 1995-97 -9.4 -12.3 35.7 47.9 7.1 n.a n.a n.a 5.3 
Micronesia 2002-04 4.3 3.6 67.7 64.l 9.7 25.2 3.4 25.0 0.8 
Previous Period 1999-01 -7.0 -8.4 69.8 78.2 16.1 24.8 4.3 31.6 2.0 
Samoa 1994-96 -0.2 -1.1 44.3 45.4 16.6 11.6 n.a n.a 6.7 
Previous Period 1991-93 -15.2 -16.7 57.0 73.7 29.7 10.9 n.a n.a 1.1 
Samoa 1995-97 2.7 1.9 41.6 39.7 14.6 10.6 n.a n.a 4.9 
Previous Period 1992-94 -12.3 -13.6 53.1 66.6 25.5 11.7 n.a n.a 4.1 
Sao Tome/Principe 1997-99 -16.0 -27.7 38.8 66.5 38.6 5.0 3.1 3.5 2.0 
Previous Period 1994-96 -26.5 -37.5 35.9 73.4 46.0 1.7 3.3 3.6 1.9 
Sao Tome/Principe 1998-00 -9.1 -19.2 34.4 53.6 26.9 5.8 2.3 3.7 2.3 
Previous Period 1995-97 -21.0 -32.1 40.1 72.2 45.8 2.3 4.0 3.5 1.5 
Seychelles 2003-04 8.6 1.2 49.9 48.7 3.3 14.9 11.9 11.2 -4.2 
Previous Period 2001-02 -6.6 -14.0 39.1 53.1 7.6 14.2 13.3 9.6 -0.5 
Solomon Islands 2003-04 0.2 2.7 42.8 40.1 16.7 8.1 2.5 6.9 7.2 
Prf'virnrn Pf'riorl 7.001 07 95 11.8 71 7 .'BO 1)0 11 ) 1 I) 50 -5.J 
Suriname 2001-03 1.5 -1.0 34.2 35.2 3.0 14.2 6.9 8.1 4.3 
Previous Period 1998-00 -9.9 -10.8 29.4 40.2 7.3 14.0 5.9 11.7 0.2 
Source: National Authorities and IMF Staff Estimatez 
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